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Abstract—Outsourcing data storage to the remote cloud can
be an economical solution to enhance data management in the
smart grid ecosystem. To protect the privacy of data, the utility
company may choose to encrypt the data before uploading them
to the cloud. However, while encryption provides confidentiality
to data, it also sacrifices the data owners’ ability to query a
special segment in their data. Searchable symmetric encryption
is a technology that enables users to store documents in ciphertext
form while keeping the functionality to search keywords in
the documents. However, most state-of-the-art SSE algorithms
are only focusing on general document storage, which may
become unsuitable for smart grid applications. In this paper,
we propose a simple, practical SSE scheme that aims to protect
the privacy of data generated in smart grid. Our scheme achieves
high space complexity with small information disclosure that
was acceptable for practical smart grid application. We also
implement a prototype over the statistical data of advanced meter
infrastructure to show the effectiveness of our approach.
Index Terms—searchable symmetric encryption, smart grid,
privacy preserving
I. INTRODUCTION
The legacy power grid is in its way to become smart with
diverse data-driven approaches. Smart grid, which introduces
advancement in sensing, monitoring, control and communica-
tion to legacy grids, is considered to be the next generation
power grid that can provide high-quality service to the public
[1]. Moreover, as one of the most critical infrastructures in
modern society, power grids are also complex and consist of
enormous components. A well-known conceptual model of
the smart grid is proposed by the U.S National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) in 2010 [2]. The model sep-
arates the smart grid into seven domains, namely generation,
transmission, distribution, customers, markets, operations, and
service provider. All these subsystems and components can
become the sources of the large volume miscellaneous data
in future smart grid systems. Some data sources in the smart
grid are shown in Fig. 1.
However, due to the divergence in structure, type and
generation rate, how to integrate, store, and manage the data
is still one of the active research fields in the smart grid
community. Recently, research on remote cloud-based storage
and management of smart grid data is becoming popular [3].
Arenas-Martinez et al.[4] presented and compared a series
of cloud-based architectures to store and process smart meter
reading data. Based on the specific characteristics of smart grid
data, Rusitschka et al.[5] proposed a cloud computing model
of ubiquitous data storage and access. In fact, outsourcing the
data storage to the cloud can be an effective solution and has
advantages in scalability, performance, and interoperability.
Fig. 1: Data Sources in Smart Grid
The cloud frameworks in [4][5] work well when the smart
grid data owners own private cloud servers and or the cloud
service is completely trusted. However, due to economic
reasons, the utility company who owns the smart grid data
may choose to outsource the data storage to third-party cloud
service providers (CSP). In this scenario, the cloud in the mod-
els becomes untrusted, and there is a privacy concern about the
smart grid data. Technically speaking, since the data are stored
in the CSP’s server, the provider can obtain full access to all
the sensitive data easily. Moreover, it is reasonable to assume
that the CSP may be interested in these data for many reasons.
For example, the advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) data
in the smart grid can contain customers’ personal information,
such as hourly measured power consumption, home location,
and payment record. By launching side-channel attacks, such
as Non-intrusive load monitoring [24], it is possible for the
CPS to learn the customer’s habits and customs, which may
bring profit to CPS in many ways.
One straightforward approach to prevent storage CPS from
accessing sensitive data in the smart grid is encrypting the
data before uploading them to the cloud. While encryption
provides confidentiality to the data, it also sacrifices the
functionalities of processing the data. One of the most critical
functions of processing data stored in the remote server is
searching. For example, a utility company wants to query the
billing statement of a specific customer. If the documents are
encrypted with the concern of privacy, the CPS can no longer
provide the search function to the utility company. In fact, this
is a common problem that not only exists in the smart grid field
but also in all cloud storage applications that require privacy
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enhancement.
With the development of privacy-preserving technology,
Searchable Symmetric Encryption (SSE) was proposed to
address the above problem. SSE is technology that enables
users to store documents in ciphertext form while keeping
the functionality to search keywords in their documents. In
recent years, a series of secure and efficient SSE schemes are
proposed [6]-[15]. However, most of them are only focusing
on general circumstances in which user’s documents are
collections of random keyword combination, and can become
inefficient or over-protect when directly applying them to
smart grid applications.
There are two characteristics that make smart grid data spe-
cial. Firstly, the smart grid data are believed to be frequently
updated and have high generation rate. This also implies there
are always new data/keywords generated, which will lead to an
increasing keyword dictionary. Furthermore, a large portion of
smart grid data are well regulated and have specific structures.
In practice, smart grid data may contain multiple attributes
that will be searched as keywords. For example, although
two utility companies may have different implementations of
storing customer billing statement, it is reasonable to assume
both implementations should have keywords such as user
identity, electricity price, smart meter reading in each record.
The two characteristics make the state-of-the-art SSE schemes
inappropriate to be applied to smart grid application. The
typical SSE schemes together with their disadvantages with
the above two characteristics will be discussed in Section II.
In this paper, we present a practical searchable symmetric
scheme that aims to protect the privacy of smart grid data.
By taking advantage of the two characteristics, our scheme
can achieve higher space efficiency with a sacrifice of a little
information disclosure which was acceptable for smart grid
system in practice. Our main contributions can be summarized
as follow:
• We review and analyze the typical state-of-the-art SSE
schemes and show why they are inappropriate for smart
grid data.
• According to the characteristics of smart grid data, we
design a simple, practical SSE scheme that provides
higher space efficiency with tolerant information leakage
in real applications.
• We implement a prototype based on the statistic data of
advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) provided by U.S.
Energy Information Administration (EIA) to show the
effectiveness of our scheme. We claim the scheme can
also be applied to other types of data in the smart grid,
such as metering data, customer billing statement, and
PMU/PDC data.
The rest of paper is organized as follow. Section II gives the
introduction of related work on SSE. Section III introduces the
threat model and notations we use. The detailed description of
our scheme will be presented in Section IV. After that, section
V introduces the implementation of the prototype and smart
grid data we use. Future work will be discussed in Section VI.
Finally, Section VII summarizes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Currently, the fundamental SSE constructions can be classi-
fied into three categories, namely construction without indexes,
construction with direct index, and construction with inverted
indexes.
The first practical SSE scheme without index construction
was proposed by Song et al.in 2000 [6]. They considered a
document as a list of words with the same length and used
a specially designed stream cipher to encrypt the document.
However, this scheme requires the server to traverse each doc-
ument word by word, which leads to a search complexity linear
to the document size. Furthermore, SSE scheme without index
usually requires specially developed encryption algorithms,
making it unscalable to current power grid communication
and control system. After that, several high impact index-
based SSE schemes were proposed. Secure Indexes by Goh
[7] built Bloom Filters as the direct index. By adjusting the
parameters of the Bloom Filter, secure indexes can achieve
efficient search complexity. However, one inherent problem
of Bloom Filter is that it will bring false-positive rate, and
this can be unacceptable for critical infrastructure like the
smart grid. Another direct index based scheme was presented
by Chang et al.[8], and they built a large index table for all
documents to enable efficient search. However, their scheme
assumes that there is a dictionary mapping all keywords to
associate identifiers. As discussed in Section I, the number of
keywords in smart grid data can be large and keep increasing.
Therefore, a scheme in [8] is also not appropriate for smart
grid applications. One of the most famous inverted index
based SSE schemes were proposed by Curtmola et al.[9]. They
presented an index scheme which achieves the highest time-
efficient search function by using a uniquely designed linked
list data structure. However, an inverted index construction
scheme has an inherent problem, namely directly updating is
difficult. Although a well-designed file management system
can mitigate the problem, inverted indexes are still not efficient
for smart grid which has new data generated all the time. The
latest research work on SSE including dynamic searchable
encryption [10]-[13], forward secure searchable encryption
[14], and fuzzy keyword searchable encryption [15].
Besides the theoretical of SSE scheme, research on applying
SSE to solve real-world problems is also active. In general,
the SSE scheme can be used to all systems which include
storage outsourcing. Tong et al.[16] employed a modified SSE
scheme of Secure Index [7] and designed a secure data sharing
mechanism for situational awareness in the power grid. Their
approach is also used to protect the privacy of e-health data
[17]. The problem of health data’ privacy is drawing more
and more attention. Li et al.[18] leveraged a secure K-nearest
neighbor (KNN) and attribute-based encryption to build a
dynamic SSE scheme for e-health data and achieves both
forward and backward security. Other applications of SSE can
be found in [19].
Fig. 2: General SSE Working Model
III. BACKGROUND
A. Threat Model and Assumptions
Our scheme interacts between two parties. As shown in
Fig. 2, we refer the party who owns the data and wants to
outsource the storage of data as the client, and the party who
provides the storage service as the server. The client uploads
the encrypted data, and associated search index to the server
and sends query afterward. For simplicity, our scheme only
considers the case that there is one keyword contained in the
query. We note that query that contains boolean operation
on multiple keywords can be regarded as the operation on
query results of multiple single keywords, which will be
briefly discussed at the end of this section. After receiving
query contains keyword information from the client, the server
should run the SSE algorithms and return a list of the identifier
of documents that contain the keyword.
Same as most state-of-the-art SSE schemes, in our threat
model we also assume that the third party server is a curious
but honest attacker, which means the cloud server should
provide normal cloud service but will try to learn the content
of data. More specifically, the server is not allowed to delete
or modify the client’s data or share the data with other parties.
However, different from SSE schemes which assume that the
client’s data is a collection of random keyword combination,
our scheme makes practical assumptions on the client’s data
based on the characteristics of smart grid data discussed in
Section I.
First, we assume the smart grid data to be stored in the
cloud should be a collection of records that have the same
data structure and contain the same number of keywords. For
example, the customer billing statement record should have
attributes like customer identifier, date, house location, smart
meter readings, and additional notes. Another example can
be the PMU data. One of the most widely used standards of
PMU data is IEEE C37.118.2 [20]. The standard gives the
format of application layer data structure of PMU data that
contains several attributes, such as data stream ID number,
time stamp, and measurement data. Moreover, as presented
in [16], the data owner can also design a hierarchical data
structure to store the smart grid data. Therefore, we believe
this assumption is practical in real power grid applications and
is easy to meet. In the rest of the paper, we will use record
and document interchangeably for simplicity.
Second, we assume the total number of records to be stored
in the cloud is much larger than the number of keywords in
each record. In practice, a record may contain up to tens of
attributes, but it is normal for a utility company to maintain
millions of customer data records or billions of measurement
data records.
One widely used security requirement of searchable sym-
metric encryption is IND2-CKA secure proposed in [7]. In
brief, IND2-CKA secure requires that the server cannot learn
anything more of the plaintext message except for the search
result. According to IND2-CKA, the number of keywords
in each document should also be kept secret. However, our
scheme allows the number of keywords in each record to be
known to the attacker (server). There are mainly two practical
reasons for this privacy sacrifice. First, SSE schemes follow
IND2-CKA secure consider the case that the client stores
general documents which contain keywords with random num-
bers. As we discussed above, since all smart grid data records
are assumed to contain the same number of keywords, it is not
reasonable to assume that the attacker cannot learn the number
in the real working scenario, like by social engineering or just
randomly guessing. Second, we will show that our scheme can
achieve high space efficiency by loosing the restriction on this
privacy leakage issue. This compromise should be acceptable
for a utility company or government department in practice.
Finally, the scheme is only used for constructing secure
search index. How to protect the privacy of the plaintext data
will not be discussed in this paper. The client can use popular
security schemes like CBC or CTR block cipher to protect the
confidentiality and schemes like HMAC to protect the integrity
of data.
B. Notations
We use ∆ = {R1, R2...R2d} to indicate a collection of
records. N is defined to be the total number of possible
keywords in a record while n is the number of desired
keywords in a record that the client want to search, where
n ≤ N . We use wi,j to denote the jth desired keyword in
record Rj where 1 ≤ i ≤ 2d and 1 ≤ j ≤ n. {0, 1}n is used
to present the set of all n bits numbers. K R← {0, 1}n means
an element K being sampled uniformly from set {0, 1}n. In
addition, we use f : {0, 1}k × {0, 1}r → {0, 1}r to define a
pseudo-random function that maps a r bits number to another
r number with a k bits key. A record’s identifier is defined as
id(R). Finally, we use h : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}r to denote a hash
function that maps random length bitwise string to an r bits
number.
IV. PRACTICAL SSE SCHEME DESIGN FOR SMART GRID
A. Construction
Secure Indexes presented in [7] gives a framework of trap-
door based searchable symmetric encryption scheme which
was widely used by the follow-up research. In general, an
SSE should consist of four polynomial time algorithms:
• Keygen(s) is run by the client to generate a master private
key MK where s is a security parameter.
• Trapdoor(MK, w) is run by the client by taking the
master key MK and a keyword w as the input, and
outputs the trapdoor Tw of word w.
• Keygen(k): Given a security parameter k, uniformly sample the master key MK R← {0, 1}k
• Trapdoor(MK,w): Given the master key MK and a keyword w, generate Tw = fMK(h(w)) of w
• BuildIndex(Ri, MK) : The input is a record Ri and the master key MK
The client:
create an n elements array IRi and initialize all elements to zero
create an set U : {x ∈ Z|0 ≤ x ≤ n− 1}
for each desired keyword wi,j in Ri do
compute Twi,j = Trapdoor(MK,wi,j)
compute Xwi,j = f
′
Twi,j
(h(id(Ri)))
pick λ R← U , update U = U − {λ}
set IRi [λ] = Xi,j
end
return (Ri, Ii)
• Search(Tw, IR) : The input is the trapdoor Tw of keyword w and the index IR of record R
The server:
compute Xw = f
′
Tw
(h(id(R)))
if Xw is in list IR then
return 1
else
return 0
end
Fig. 3: Four Polynomial time functions
• BuildIndex(R, MK) is run by the client by taking the
master key MK and a record R as the input, and outputs
the index IR for record R.
• SearchIndex(Tw, IR) is run by the server by taking a
trapdoor Tw and a document’s index IR as the input, and
outputs 1 if w ∈ R or 0 otherwise.
In general SSE scheme, the encrypted documents together
with the associated indexes will be kept by the server. When
searching, the client generates the trapdoor Tw for word w
and send Tw to the server. For each record R, the server runs
the SearchIndex(Tw, IR) function and determine whether R
contains w. The server will finally return to the client a list
of the identifiers of records which contain w. The framework
requires that only the client who holds the private master key
MK can generate the trapdoor Tw for each word w, such that
the server cannot learn related information from the index. Our
scheme also follows this framework and is built in the direct
index structure.
Our scheme uses a codeword array as the index for a record.
For the keyword w, the Trapdoor function computes the hash
value h(w) of w, where h : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}r, and outputs the
trapdoor Tw = fMK(h(w)), where f : {0, 1}k × {0, 1}r →
{0, 1}r is a pseudo-random function. To build the index IRi
of record Ri, the BuildIndex function calls Trapdoor and
computes the codeword Xi,j = f
′
Twi,j
(h(id(Ri))), where
f
′
: {0, 1}r × {0, 1}r → {0, 1}r is another pseudo-random
function. Each codeword Xi,j should be randomly written
into an n element array IRi , and this step can be done with
a pseudo-random generator in implementation. The detailed
design of our scheme can be found in Fig. 3.
As discussed early in this section, we assume the smart
grid data ∆ to be a collection of records with each record Ri
contains N keywords. Considering the scenario that not all
types of keywords in the data are necessary for searching, and
the data owner only wants to query records by several specific
types of keywords. For example, based on the standard IEEE
C37.118.2, the utility company may want to search PMU data
records by ID number or timestamp, and there may be no need
to search by synchronization word. Therefore, our scheme
firstly allows the data owner to select the n (n ≤ N) types of
keywords she wants to query based on specific applications.
After determining n types of keywords, the client should
run function Keygen to obtain a k bits master key MK and
keep it secret. Subsequently, for each record Ri in ∆, the
client runs the BuildIndex function to obtain the index IRi
of record R. Finally, the index IRi should be attached to the
encrypted record Ri and uploaded to the server.
To search for a keyword w, the client needs to compute the
trapdoor Tw = fMK(h(w)) and sends Tw to the server. After
receiving the Tw, the server computes Xi,w = f
′
Tw
(h(id(Ri)))
for each ciphertext record Ri(1 ≤ i ≤ 2d), and checks whether
Xi,w is contained in IRi . If so, the server returns id(Ri) to
the client.
B. Analysis and Comparison
As stated at the beginning of Section III, our scheme aims
to protect the data privacy such that the adversary cannot
learn any other information about the plaintext record from the
index except for the search result and the number of desired
keywords in the record. We analyze the security of our scheme
TABLE I: Perfomance Comparison of Various SSE Schemes
scheme plaintext encryption index false-positive update search complexity index size
final scheme [6] special no no easy O(2d ·N) none
Z-IDX [7] general direct yes easy O(2d) O(2d · n)
PPSED [8] general direct no easy O(2d) O((2d)2)
SSE-1 [9] general inverted no hard O(1) O(2d · n)
our scheme general direct no easy O(2d · n) O(2d · n)
2dis the number of records, N is the number of all keywords in a record. n is the number of desired keywords in a record, where 2d  n.
from two aspects. First, considering a simple scenario that only
one index of a record is given, a polynomial time attacker
can not learn the original keywords from the index. This is
correct because if the attacker can learn the keyword from
the codeword, she will be able to break the pseudo-random
function, which is contradictory to the assumptions. Second,
we consider the unlinkability of our scheme, which means the
attacker is not able to learn whether two records have the same
keyword w from their indexes without the trapdoor Tw. This
is achieved by introducing the identifier of records to build
the codeword. The same keyword in two records will have
different codewords in two indexes. We refer the reader to [7]
for the mathematical proof.
In general, the main methodology of our scheme is increas-
ing the space efficiency of the SSE scheme with permission
of few information leakages based on the characteristics of
smart grid data. Our scheme was built based on direct index
structure, so it is dynamic and easy-updating. We use the
codeword array as the index of each record, which leads to a
small index size compared with schemes that involve keyword
dictionary. Since the codewords are randomly inserted, the
searching complexity of our scheme becomes O(2d · n).
However, since the number of desired keywords n is believed
to be a very small constant in practical application, the search
algorithm will still be efficient. Our scheme is similar to the
PPSED scheme described in [8]. Both schemes used direct
index structure and an array as the index. However, since there
is always new keywords (e.g. timestamps) generated in smart
grid data, the index size of the PPSED scheme will become
extremely large. Table I gives a detailed comparison between
our design and the widespread SSE schemes.
C. Extension
It is obvious to see that updating new record and associated
index to the server is straightforward. The client just needs to
run the BuildIndex function of the new record to obtain the
index, and appends the (encrypted record, index) pair to the
records and indexes stored in the server.
The plain scheme considers the scenario that only one key-
word is searched in a round. In practice, the client may want
to search for records that meet specific keyword requirements.
One simple example can be a government department who
wants to query a dataset of utility companies. A meaningful
query can be (State: TN and Establish Year: 1998 or 1999).
The boolean operations on multiple keywords can be easily
applied to the codewords matching process when the server
runs Search function.
V. IMPLEMENTATION
A. Smart Grid Data
TABLE II: Features of AMI Dataset from EIA
category feature
Utility Year, Month, Utility Number,
Characteristics Utility Name, State, Data Status
Number AMR - Automated
Metering Reading
Number AMI - Advanced Residential, Commercial,
Metering Infrastructure Industrial, Transportation, Total
Non AMR/AMI Meters
Total Number of Meters
Energy Saved - AMI (MWh)
The public dataset we used to test the effectiveness of
our scheme is the statistical AMI data provided by the U.S.
Energy Information Administration (EIA) [21]. The AMI data
are derived from EIA-861M form, which stands for Monthly
Electric Power Industry Report. The report collects sales
of electricity and revenue each month from a statistically
chosen sample of electric utilities in the United States. EIA
started to collect monthly green pricing, net metering, and
advanced metering data since 2011. We choose the CSV file
of advanced metering data of the year 2016 as the dataset for
our implementation.
As shown in Table II, the CSV contains 31 columns,
including year, month, utility name, state, residential AMI,
and so on. In our experiment, we select all features except
Year from Utility Characteristics and all features from AMI
related categories as our desired types of keywords. The CSV
file contains 4819 records in total, and the data types include
string and unsigned integer.
B. Prototype
For simplicity, we use Python 2.7 as the programming
language for the prototype. We claim that a low-level language
like C can be used in practice with the consideration of speed.
We build the encryption scheme with the help of Pycrypto
[22], which is a widely used cryptography library for python.
Generally, the ciphers and hash functions in Pycrypto are
written in C and provide Python API. We use Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES) block cipher with 128 bits key as
the pseudo-random function and the MD5 as the hash function
described in our scheme. We note that MD5 has been severely
compromised and is no longer secure for integrity protection.
However, the MD5 in our prototype is only used to generate
a unique identifier for record and keyword, similar to the
building dictionary process in other schemes.
Since the original ciphertext usually contains unprintable
characters that will destroy CSV format, we store the ci-
phertext as the hexadecimal string to maintain a clear CSV
format for demonstration. However, the hexadecimal string
will lead to larger index size. Therefore, we suggest that an
efficient file-index management system is needed for real-
world applications.
The source code is tested on a Mac OS X machine with
a 1.6 GHz Intel Core i5 processor and 8GB memory. Our
experiment result shows that 4819 indexes can be searched
in around 0.15 second. The source code of the prototype is
available on Github [23].
VI. FUTURE WORK
Our scheme only considers the one client scenario. In
practice, it is common for the data owner to grant access
permission to a group of people. Attribute-based encryption
may be used to address this problem in the future. Meanwhile,
same as the PPSED scheme in [8], our scheme also suffers
forward information leakage, which means the attacker can
learn the information of the plaintext from newly added
indexes based on previous queries. More information about
the SSE forward security can be found in [14].
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we firstly review and give a comparison of the
state-of-the-art searchable symmetric encryption schemes, and
analyze why these schemes are not appropriate for smart grid
application. After that, we present a practical scheme based
on the characteristics of smart grid data. We show that space
efficient and easy update SSE scheme is available by allowing
a little information leakage which is acceptable in practice.
Finally, we implement a prototype based on statistical AMI
data to show the effectiveness of our scheme.
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